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Is Anyone Listening to Me?: Bartnicki v. Vopper
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat
from the world, and man, under the refining influence of
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual; but modern enterprise and invention have,
through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.'
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis
I. INTRODUCTION
If Warren and Brandeis's statement was true in 1890, it is even
more true today. The quantum technological leaps made in the last
century have emaciated our privacy. While individual privacy
interests usually have been protected by the Supreme Court and
various federal and state statutes, they nonetheless remain vulnerable.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,2 the United States Supreme Court held the
First Amendment protected a rebroadcast on commercial radio of an
illegally intercepted cellular phone conversation.3 The Court found
the content of the conversation was a matter of public concern, and
thus held the media's freedom of speech interest outweighed the
speaker's privacy interest.4 Bartnicki, therefore, serves as an example
of the frailty of privacy.
Our communications have a long history of protection from
intrusion. We are protected by the Fourth Amendment from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.5 This
protection extends to telephone conversations and other forms of
communication. Protection of communications also comes in the
form of many federal and state statutes. In fact, the statutes declared
unconstitutional in Bartnicki were implemented specifically to protect
individuals' communications.7
The privacy interest in Bartnicki came head to head with another
cherished American institution, freedom of the press. This interest
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1. Samuel Warren& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 196 (1890).
2. 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001).
3. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1756 (2001).
4. Id. at 525, 121 S. Ct. at 1760.
5. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
7. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 at 2153 (1968).
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also receives the highest form of protection from the Constitution.8
In addition, the media enjoy statutory' and jurisprudential" authority
to disseminate information. It is therefore inevitable that the privacy
interests of individuals and the freedom enjoyed by the media will
clash. This clash occurred in Bartnicki where the Court found the
media's interest to be of greater weight and held the statutes
prohibiting disclosure violated the First Amendment. The Court
stated the statutes implicated the core purposes of the First
Amendment because they imposed sanctions on the publication of
truthful information of public concern."
The Court's decision in Bartnicki is flawed. The decision ignores
the sound judgment of Congress and forty states, including Louisiana.
The Court also applied the wrong standard ofjudicial review. These
statutes are content neutral and therefore are subject only to
intermediate scrutiny. However, the Court applied strict scrutiny
usually reserved for those regulations affecting content. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Court's decision ignores social reality.
Allowing this type of disclosure will create a chilling of free speech
which the First Amendment was designed to avoid.
This note details the Bartnicki decision and its ramifications on
speech. Part II explains the facts and procedural history of Bartnicki.
Part ill is an overview of Justice Stevens's majority opinion. Part IV
explores why the Court's decision is flawed. Finally, Part V focuses
on implications of Bartnicki for Louisiana.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
During 1992 and most of 1993, the Pennsylvania State Education
Association, a union representing the teachers at Wyoming Valley
West High School, engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations with
the school board.' 2 Gloria Bartnicki was the chief negotiator for the
Wyoming Valley teacher's union.'3 During the negotiations,
Bartnicki used the cellular phone in her car to call Anthony Kane, a
teacher at Wyoming Valley and president of the teacher's union. 4 In
this conversation, Bartnicki and Kane discussed the status of the
8. U.S. Const. amend. I.
9. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1996).
10. New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713,91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
11. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534, 121 S. Ct. at 1765.
12. Id. at 518, 121 S. Ct. at 1756.
13. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753
(2001) (Nos. 99-1687, 99-1728).
14. Id.
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negotiations and the timing of a proposed strike. 5 Also, some
questionable negotiating strategies were mentioned which could have
been misconstrued as advocating violence.'
6
Unknown to either Bartnicki or Kane, the conversation was
intercepted and recorded on a cassette tape by an unknown person,
apparently using a scanner that picked up the signal from Bartnicki's
cellular phone." The tape was then placed in the mailbox of Jack
Yocum, the president of the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers'
Association, an organization opposed to the union's bargaining
proposals. 8 After listening to the tape and recognizing the voices of
Bartnicki and Kane, Yocum gave a copy of the tape to Frederick
Vopper, the host of a talk show on a local radio station.'9 Both
Yocum and Vopper realized the conversation between Bartnicki and
Kane involved a cellular phone, and that a scanner probably had been
used to intercept the call.2°
Early in the fall of 1993, the union and the school board accepted
a non-binding arbitration proposal that was generally favorable to the
union." After the agreement was reached, Vopper played the tape
during his talk show. Until that broadcast, Bartnicki and Kane did
not know their conversation had been intercepted and taped.22 They
sued Vopper for civil damages. Bartnicki and Kane claimed the
disclosure violated both Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act of 1968, as amended by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198623 and the Pennsylvania
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.24 Both statutes
prohibit the intentional interception of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication. More importantly, the statutes also prohibit the
intentional disclosure of such communications if one knows or has
reason to know the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral or electronic communication.2 6 Vopper contended the
statutes were not violated because he had nothing to do with the
interception and the conversation may have been intercepted
15. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518, 121 S. Ct. at 1756.
16. Specifically, Kane said "If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're
gonna have to go to their homes ..... To blow off their front porches, we'll have to do
some work on some of those guys."
17. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 13, at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 13, at 6.
21. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at519, 121 S. Ct. at 1757.
22. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 13, at 5.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2001).
24. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703 (2000).
25. 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) (2001).
26. 18 U.S.C. §2511(c) (2001).
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inadvertently.27 Moreover, Vopper argued, even if disclosure of the
conversation did violate the statutes, the disclosure was protected by
the First Amendment.28
B. Procedural History
The District Court rejected the defendant's statutory argument
because, under the plain language, an individual violates the federal
act by disclosing the contents of an electronic communication when
he knows or has reason to know the information was obtained by
illegal means.29 On summary judgment, the District Court also
concluded the text of the interception raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the conversation was intentionally
intercepted.a Finally, the District Court rejected defendant's First
Amendment defense because the statutes were content neutral laws
of general applicability that contained no indicia of prior restraint.31
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.32 All three members of the
panel agreed the statutes were content neutral and therefore subject
only to intermediate scrutiny.33 The majority nonetheless concluded
the statutes failed intermediate scrutiny. 4 Therefore, the court held
the provisions could not be constitutionally applied to penalize the
use or disclosure of illegally intercepted information where there was
no allegation the defendants participated in or encouraged the
interception.35
IE[. SUPREME COURT OPINION
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 36 and
affirmed. In the majority decision by Justice Stevens, the Court found
that the interception was intentional and therefore illegal.37 The Court
also noted that the defendant had reason to know it was unlawfully
obtained, thus making the disclosure illegal.3" The only issue before
the Court, therefore, was whether the statutes as applied to this case
27. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520, 121 S. Ct. at 1757.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 129 (3d Cir. 1999).
33. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 521, 121 S. Ct. at 1758.
34. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
35. id.
36. 530 U.S. 1260, 120 S. Ct. 2716 (2000).
37. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753.
38. Id.
violated the First Amendment.39 Specifically, did the media's interest
in disclosing this conversation outweigh the privacy rights of
Bartnicki and Kane? In determining this issue the Court accepted
several facts as true.4" The defendants were not involved in the illegal
interception of the conversation, and their access to the information
on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even thoug the information itself
was intercepted unlawfully by someone else. More importantly, the
Court noted that the subject matter of the conversation was a matter
of public concern.42 The public concern, according to the Court,
stemmed from the fact that the statements about the negotiations
would have been newsworthy had they been made in a public arena.43
This suggests that the Court saw the conversation as one of public
concern because it involved labor negotiations and not that it could
be loosely interpreted as advocating violence.
The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the statutes were
content neutral. It recognized that the purpose of the statutes was to
protect the privacy of communications, and that they focused on the
source of the communication rather than its subject matter.45
However, the Court also recognized prohibition of disclosures as a
regulation of pure speech.46 It analogized the delivery of the taped
conversations here to the delivery of a pamphlet, making it the kind
of speech the First Amendment protects.4 The Court, therefore,
contradicts itself by saying the statutes are both content neutral and
regulations of pure speech. Nevertheless, the Court demanded a
privacy need of the highest order to justify the interest protected by
the statutes. This suggests the Court actually analyzed the statutes as
regulations of pure speech.
The Court recognized two interests served by the statutes .48 The
first interest was to remove an incentive for parties to intercept
private conversations.49 The Court rejected this interest because the
normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an
appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it. The
plaintiffs presented no empirical evidence to support the assumption
that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526, 121 S. Ct. at 1761.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529, 121 S. Ct. at 1762.
49. Id.
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interceptions.5 0 The second interest was minimizing the harm to
persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted."1 The
Court was sympathetic to this interest, and stated that disclosure of
these conversations might have a chilling effect on private speech.5"
However, while the Court found this interest to be significantly
stronger, it nonetheless found it insufficient. The Court held that
privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public concern. 3 Moreover, a loss of privacy
is a natural consequence of involvement in public affairs.' Open
debate about public issues is an important goal, and the Court saw
this goal as more important than protecting private conversations.
Finding the negotiations between the union and the school board an
unquestionable matter of public concern, the Court held the
prohibition against disclosure violated the First Amendment."5
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION IS INCORRECT
A. The Statutes Under Scrutiny
The statutes in question in Bartnicki are 18 U.S.C. §2511 and 18
Pa. C.S.A. §5703. Both statutes contain similar language. The
federal statute creates a prohibition for anyone who "intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication."56 It also provides a prohibition for anyone who
"intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person
the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing
or having reason to know the information was obtained through
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation
of this subsection. 57
The Pennsylvania statute contains similar language and states a
person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he "intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oralcommunication. ' '"8 Pennsylvania's statute also contains an anti-
disclosure provision making it a felony for anyone who "intentionally
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 533, 121 S. Ct. at 1764.
53. Id. at 534, 121 S. Ct. at 1765.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2001).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(c) (2001).
58. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703(1) (2000).
discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of
any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, knowing or having reason to know the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral
communication." 9
B. Legislative Judgment
The Bartnicki decision exempts news media from the anti-
disclosure provisions of these statutes when the information is of
public concern.' This decision ignores the sound judgments of
various legislative bodies. When Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was enacted, Congress
recognized the tremendous scientific and technological developments
that have taken place in the last century making possible today the
widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques.6'
Congress also recognized that as a result of these developments in
surveillance, privacy of communication was seriously jeopardized. 2
Title I[ was enacted with the purpose, in part, of protecting the
privacy of wire and oral communications." Interestingly, Congress
took notice of the increasing problem of employer-labor espionage
and the difficulty of conducting business meetings in private.64 This
suggests Congress envisioned situations very similar to the facts of
Bartnicki. While the author does not suggest the Wyoming Valley
West School Board was responsible for the interception and recording
of the Bartnicki conversation, the end result was the same. The
union's strategies were intercepted and disclosed to the employer. In
addition, Bartnicki and Kane were trying to conduct business
privately, and that privacy was violated. Therefore, Congress, in
drafting Title I1, sought to prevent exactly what happened in
Bartnicki.
In drafting Title Ill, Congress paid special attention to the United
States Supreme Court decisions in New York v. Berger65 and Katz v.
United States.66 In Berger, the Court declared a New York
eavesdropping statute unconstitutional. The statute in Berger
authorized an ex parte order for eavesdropping. 67 The Court held the
59. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703(2) (2000).
60. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753.
61. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, supra note 7, at 2154.
62. Id.
63. Id. at2153.
64. Id. at 2154.
65. 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct.1873 (1967).
66. 389 U.S. 347, 98 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
67. Berger, 388 U.S. at 54, 87 S. Ct. at 1881.
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statute was too broad resulting in a trespassory intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area.6' The Court also held that
conversation, and the right to keep it private, is constitutionally
protected.69 In addition, the Berger Court provided a constitutional
framework within which a wiretapping statute should fit in order to
survive constitutional scrutiny. Congress took note of these
standards, which focused on protecting the privacy of conversation,
in drafting Title I1.70
In Katz v. United States, the Court held the Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording petitioner's
words violated the privacy which he justifiably relied upon while
using a telephone booth.' There, the FBI had attached electronic
eavesdropping devices to the outside of a public telephone booth
which Katz used to make phone calls.7 2 The Court stated that what
a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Like Berger, Katz seeks
to provide greater protection for our private conversations.
Admittedly, Berger and Katz dealt with protection from government
intrusion. Nonetheless, the level of privacy afforded to conversations
should be the same whether the intrusion comes from the government
or private individuals. This was Congress's goal in drafting Title
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act as an amendment of Title ll and to protect against the
unauthorized interception of electronic communications. The act
was designed to update and clarify federal privacy protections and
standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and
telecommunications technologies.76 Congress was concerned with the
lack of federal statutory standards to protect the privacy and security
of communications transmitted by new telecommunications
technology.77 The concern was that this lack of protection would
have the effect of discouraging use of such innovations.78 One of the
advancements recognized by Congress to be in need of protection was
68. Id. at 58, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
69. Id. at 51, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
70. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, supra note 7, at 2161.
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at 512.
72. Id. at 348, 88 S. Ct. at 509.
73. Id. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511.
74. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, supra note 7, at 2162.
75. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3555 (1986).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 3559.
78. Id.
[Vol. 63596
the cellular phone.79  They understood that cellular phone
conversations could be intercepted by special scanners or modified
radio scanners.8 0
The legislative history indicates that Congress made a rational
judgment to protect the type of conversation involved in Bartnicki not
only from interception but disclosure as well.8' In addition to federal
legislation, forty states have enacted similar legislation to protect
these types of communication.8 2 The Court ignored these judgments
andreplaced them with its own: "The Court's decision to hold these
statutes unconstitutional rests upon nothing more than the bald
substitution of its own prognostications in place of the reasoned
judgment of 41 legislative bodies and the United States Congress. ,83
The Court inadvertently overruled itself by doing so. Title 1In was
drafted with the Court's decisions in Berger and Katz in mind. These
cases called for increased protection of private communications.
Congress obliged by creating prohibitions on interception and
disclosure of phone conversations. Now, however, the Court in
Bartnicki has changed the rules. In discussing the privacy of
communication interest, the Court did not say that interest is no
longer in need of protection but that the media's interest in invading
it is greater.
The facts of Bartnicki make for a difficult decision. The Court
recognized there are "important interests on both sides of the
constitutional calculus." It agreed that public disclosure of private
conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech. 5
It also recognized that there exists "valid independent justifications
79. Id. at 3556.
80. Id. at 3563.
81. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at3555 (1986).
82. See Ala. Code §13A-11-30; Alaska Stat. Ann. §42.20.300(d); Ark. Code
Ann. §5-60-120; Cal.Penal Code Ann. §631; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-303; Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 11 §1336(b)(1); D.C. Code Ann. §23-542; Fla. Stat. §934.03(1); Ga.
Code Ann. §16-11-66.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. §803-42; Idaho Code §18-6702; Ill.
Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/14-2(b); Iowa Code §808B.2; Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4002;
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §526.060; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:1303; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 15 §710(3); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-402; Mass. Gen. Laws
§272:99(C)(3); Mich. Comp. Law Ann. §750.539e; Minn. Stat. §626A.02; Mo.
Rev. Stat. §542.402; Neb. Rev. Stat. §86-702; Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.630; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §570-A:2; N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A: I 56A-3; N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-12-1; N.C.
Gen. Stat. §15A-287; N.D. Cent. Code §12.1-15-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§2933.52(A)(3); Okla. Stat., Tit. 13, §176.3; Ore. Rev. Stat. §165.540; 18 Pa.
Const. Stat. §5703; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-21; Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-601; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 16.02; Utah Code Ann. §77-23a-4; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-62;
W.Va. Code §62-1D-3; Wis. Stat. §968.31(1); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-3-602.
83. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 552, 121 S.Ct. at 1774 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
84. Id.. at 532, 121 S. Ct. at 1764.
85. Id.
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for prohibiting these disclosures. 8 6 The Court is well within the
bounds of judicial review in replacing Congress's judgment with its
own. After all, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the Court
to say what the law is."8' However, this is a close case and deference
should be given to the well thought out and reasoned judgment of
Congress and forty state legislatures. As the dissent in Bartnicki
noted,
Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to evaluate
the vast amounts of data bearing upon complex issues and
that sound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast
future events and to anticipate the likely impact of these
events based on deductions and inferences for which
complete empirical support may be unavailable.88
This is even more true when Congress used the previous judgment of
the Court as guidance. Here, Congress took its cue from the Court to
create more privacy, and the Court is now taking that privacy away.
C. Standard of Review
Each court that examined Bartnicki determined the statutes at
issue were content neutral. Determining if a statute is content neutral
is not an easy task. In determining content neutrality, a court will
inquire whether "the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys. 8 1 If a
restriction on speech makes no reference to the ideas or views
expressed, it will be seen as content neutral.9" The government's
purpose will be the controlling consideration.9' As evidenced by the
legislative history, the purpose of the Bartnicki statutes is to protect
the privacy of communications. There was no legislative intent to
place restrictions on a particular viewpoint. Congress could not
disagree with what was said here because they had no way of
knowing what it would be. How the speech is made is the issue
rather than what is said or who is saying it. It stands to reason then
that these statutes are content neutral. Once the Court determines a
statute is content neutral, the appropriate level of judicial review is
applied.
86. Id.
87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550, 121 S. Ct. at 1773 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
89. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754
(1989).
90. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2459 (1994).
91. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791,109 S. Ct. at 2754.
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This appropriate level of review for a content neutral regulation
is intermediate scrutiny.92 While this standard of review is not always
labeled intermediate scrutiny, the requirements are generally the
same. In United States v. O'Brien, the United States Supreme Court
held a regulation of speech and non-speech conduct is justified if it
"furthers an important or significant government interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression with an incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms no geater than essential to the
furtherance of the government interest. 93 The statute in O 'Brien
prohibited the destruction or mutilation of draft cards.
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,94 the Court adopted
the O 'Brien requirements for sustaining a content neutral regulation.
The statute in Turner required cable television systems to devote a
portion of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast
televison stations.9 5 There, the Court even stated that regulations
unrelated to content are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.96
The Court further stated that "these regulations are not subject to
strict scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk
of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue."9' 7
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,"8 the Court again stated the
requirements for a valid content neutral regulation but in a slightly
different formulation. The regulations in Ward were designed to
control the volume of concerts in New York City's Central Park.99
There, the Court stated that content neutral regulations must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and that
they [must] leave open ample alternative channels of communication
of the information.""0 This formulation is simply the intermediate
scrutiny of Turner in different clothing.
While the Court may not always use the same terminology, the
requirements for a content neutral regulation to survive intermediate
scrutiny are the same. There must be an important or significant
government interest advanced by the regulation. The regulation must
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. According to the Ward
Court, "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
92. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
93. Unites States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968).
94. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
95. Id. at626, 114S. Ct. at2451.
96. Id. at 642, 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
97. Id.
98. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S. Ct. at 2754.
99. Id. at 784, 109 S. Ct. at 2750.
100. Id.
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achieved less effectively absent the regulation."'' Finally, the
regulation must not restrict the First Amendment freedoms any more
than necessary.
The Bartnicki statutes meet the requirements of a valid content
neutral regulation. The government interest at issue here is privacy
of communication. Intuition leads one to believe this is an important
interest, and the Bartnicki Court agrees.'0 2
The Bartnicki statutes are narrowly tailored to serve that
government interest. The only way to prevent disclosure is to
prohibit it and provide a penalty for violating that prohibition.
Without the regulation here, the government interest would be
achieved less effectively. Removal of the disclosure prohibition
makes it difficult to keep communication private. Even though the
interception prohibition may remain, there is little deterrence for
someone to surreptitiously record a conversation and then "launder"
it to someone with clean hands for disclosure. Without the disclosure
provision, situations like the one in Bartnicki may become more
familiar. The government cannot effectively protect our
communication without prohibiting disclosure.
Finally, the regulations in Bartnicki go no further than necessary
to protect communication. The protection afforded by these statutes
in no way has the effect of suppressing free expression. In fact, the
opposite outcome is more likely. Knowing a conversation will not be
disclosed to the public will make the speakers more likely to express
themselves freely. In addition, these laws do not attempt to suppress
ideas or specific types of speech. They discriminate only on the basis
of the form of communication and not content. The alleged First
Amendment freedoms restricted here are the desires of those who
seek to publicly disclose these conversations. Despite meeting the
requirements for a valid content neutral regulation, the Court
nonetheless held the statutes violated the First Amendment.
The Court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes despite an
admission the statutes were content neutral. Justice Stevens stated
the plaintiffs in Bartnicki must have shown a need of the highest
order to constitutionally prohibit disclosure of the intercepted phone
call. 103 Justice Stevens cited Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. " as
authority for that standard. Specifically, the Court in Smith held if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance, state officials may not constitutionally punish
101. Id. at 799, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting Unites States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675, 689 (1985)).
102. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535, 121 S. Ct. at 1765.
103. Id. at 528, 121 S. Ct. at 1761.
104. 443 U.S. 97, 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
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publication of the informition absent a need of the highest order."°0
The Bartnicki Court followed this principle, and found the applicable
statutes violated the First Amendment. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,'0 6
another case followed by the Bartnicki majority, the prohibition was
against disclosure of the name of a rape victim. Finally, the Bartnicki
Court relied on Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,'07 which
dealt with confidential proceedings before a state judicial review
commission. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held the
regulations prohibiting disclosure of truthful information violated the
First Amendment. The regulations at issue in Bartnicki are quite
different, however. The Bartnicki statutes do not regulate based on
content. In contrast, the statutes under scrutiny in the cases relied on
by the majority do regulate based on content. A content based speech
restriction can survive only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.'0° Therefore,
the Bartnicki majority applied the wrong level ofjudicial review.
The dissent in Bartnicki, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, gave
a succinct analysis of the standard ofjudicial review that should have
been applied to these statutes. Justice Rehnquist stated,
These laws are content neutral; they only regulate information
that was illegally obtained; they do not restrict publication of
what is already in the public domain; they impose no special
burdens upon the media; they have a scienter requirement to
provide fair warning; and they promote the privacy and free
speech of those using cellular phones."
The dissent also pointed out that these statutes were narrowly tailored
and that it would be a mistake to apply strict scrutiny."0 Instead of
the strict scrutiny applied in Smith, Florida Star, and Landmark, the
Court should have applied intermediate scrutiny. As explained
above, the statutes would survive that level of judicial review.
D. Social Reality
The Bartnicki majority made two critical errors: ignoring the
judgement of Congress and forty state legislatures, and applying the
improper standard of judicial review. In addition to those mistaken
105. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 99 S. Ct. 2667,2671
(1979). In Smith, the statute in question sought to prevent disclosure of the name
of a juvenile defendant.
106. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
107. 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978).
108. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126, 109
S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989).
109. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 548, 121 S. Ct. at 1772.
110. Id.
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judgements, the Court made yet another error. The Bartnicki decision
is incorrect because it ignored social reality. Privacy of
communication provides a great deal of social utility. Specifically,
it is often crucial to liberty and progress.
One of the most common forms of protection of communication
is privilege. Whether the conversation is between an attorney and his
client, a doctor and his patient, or between spouses, without privilege
American individual liberty would be greatly eroded. Those
protected conversations may often involve matters of public concern,
but they are nonetheless protected from disclosure.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that privilege is governed
by the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States
in light of reason and experience."' However, the law of privileges
is not just a rule governing admissibility of evidence. Its primary
purpose is to protect confidentiality of certain communications under
circumstances where such confidentiality serves broad societal
goals." 2 This principle has led to the development of the privileges
with which we are all familiar. The purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients. This promotes broader public interests in
observance of law and administration of justice. 3 Likewise, the
purpose of the doctor-patient privilege is to protect the patient by
encouraging full and confidential disclosure to his physician of all
information, however embarrassing, which might aid the physician in
diagnosis and treatment. "4 A similar principle is also seen in spousal
immunity. This privilege has been recognized on grounds that it is
necessary to foster family peace as well as benefit the public."5
The purpose behind these widely recognized privileges is to foster
communication for the good of the individual and the public. The
conversation between Bartnicki and Kane deserves the same
protection. Without it, the willingness of individuals to speak
candidly and openly will be drastically diminished. The purpose of
recognized privileges applies squarely to this situation. While the
author does not advocate the creation of a union president-union
negotiator privilege, the circumstances surrounding Bartnicki and
Kane's conversation fit within the purpose of recognized privileges,
thus justifying the existence of the statutes struck down by the Court.
If individuals know their cellular phone conversations are subject to
interception and disclosure, they are less likely to speak freely. It is
accepted that cellular phone transmissions are generally not secure
111. Fed.R.Evid.501.
112. Perrington v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
113. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
114. Hardy v. Reiser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
115. U.S. v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975).
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and are fairly easy to intercept as evidenced by this case.
Nonetheless, this ease of interception shows why protection is
necessary. Protection of these conversations will encourage dialogue
on subjects regardless of how embarrassing or controversial they may
be. Encouraging this discourse will be beneficial to the individuals
and the public at large.
Admittedly, there are some circumstances where privilege does
not stand, nor should it. Perhaps the most famous case of denial of
privilege is United States v. Nixon. 11 6 In that case, President Nixon
was ordered to produce tapes of conversations that took place in the
oval office. Nixon invoked executive privilege in hopes of
preventing disclosure of these tapes. The Supreme Court did not
agree that privilege should apply. The Court held that while such a
privilege does exist, it was outweighed in this case by the need to
develop all the relevant facts in a criminal trial." 7 Therefore, our
conversations do not deserve absolute protection from disclosure. No
rights are absolute. As we see in Nixon, where the benefit of
disclosure outweighs the benefit of protection, the privilege should
not prevail. However, this is not the case in Bartnicki. A criminal
prosecution was not at stake without the disclosure of the
conversation between Bartnicki and Kane. There was no imminent
threat to the public. Therefore, the conversation deserves protection
from disclosure under the same principles that underlie privileges.
Privacy also serves a useful function in the daily operation of
government. In Tribes on the Hill, J. Mclver Weatherford describes
how the process of creating legislation in Congress has become open
to the public, specifically the media." 8 The first members of
Congress were few in number and knew each other quite well. This
allowed them to speak plainly and conduct the business at hand with
little fanfare." 9 Space for meeting was limited, which put them
largely beyond the public eye and beyond the need for dramatic
displays to the galleries or to reporters. "' In this somewhat isolated
environment, Congress operated efficiently.'
Gradually, Americans realized the decisions made in Congress
had a great impact on their lives and demanded the opening of the
proceedings to the public.12 At the same time, the size of Congress
was growing as more states joined the union. The combination of
116. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
117. Id.
118. J. Mclver Weatherford. Tribes on the Hill, (Massachusetts: Bergin &
Garvey, 1981).
119. Id. at 167.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 167-68.
122. Id. at 170.
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increased size and publicity had a profound impact on congressional
procedure; it became markedly more cumbersome.'23 Meetings of the
House, with over one hundred Congressmen and even more
onlookers, saw little careful legislative thought.'24 This impractical
situation led to the real work of government retreating from the public
eye, and the committee system developed.'25 It was in the privacy of
committees that the real work of drafting legislation took place.
The same pressure to open the floor of the House and Senate to
the public was applied to disclose the business of the committees. In
1946, the Legislative Reorganization Act opened all committee
hearings to the public and the press.'26 Unfortunately, the same
consequences of disclosing the business of the floor of Congress were
soon to follow. The proceedings in the committees became circus-
like and legislative efficiency suffered. Again, the result was the
retreat of Congress to get their work done behind the scenes.'27 As
expected, the public has clamored for access to these meetings as
well. The result has been an endless cycle of "hide and seek" causing
some legislation to take several years to reach Congress.2
The need for Congress to retract from public scrutiny provides
another example of the need for privacy in communication. As there
is less privacy, society becomes less efficient. If we know we are
being watched or listened to, we behave and speak much differently
than if we have complete privacy. As Weatherford points out, this is
the problem Congress was plagued with as their proceedings became
open to the public.'29 Congress changed the way they conducted their
business because they were being watched. This lack of privacy
created a shift from open, frank discussions to a circus-like
atmosphere designed to play to the constituency. The result was an
inefficient organization with more style than substance.
The decision in Bartnicki will have a similar effect on our
personal lives. While the negotiations of the Wyoming Valley West
Teachers Association pale in national importance to the work of
Congress, the same principle still applies. Allowing public disclosure
of private conversations that are of public concern will lead to a
retreat from the public's eyes and ears into a "back room" of
inefficiency. If Bartnicki and Kane knew their conversation was
being recorded for public disclosure they undoubtedly would have
chosen their words more carefully. Perhaps they would have decided
123. Weatherford, supra note 118, at 171.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 173.
126. Id. at 179.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Weatherford, supra note 118, at 186.
129. Id.
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not to have the conversation at all. Certainly, there was a strong need
for them to keep their strategy for the union out of the hands of the
school board. The possibility of disclosure creates an incentive to lie
about their true intentions, delay the conversation until it can be
conducted with no one listening, or not have the conversation at all.
Regardless of what people like Bartnicki and Kane choose, the end
result will be an inefficient process of negotiating. Just like
Congress, the union will seek a more private means of developing
their strategy. This will add more layers to the process, as well as
lengthen it. Making matters worse, the same problem will exist for
the school board. If what the union is saying is of public concern,
then certainly what the school board has to say is of public concern,
and therefore similarly subject to disclosure.
Freedom of the press is an important value in America. Its
citizens look to the press to inform them about the happenings in their
communities. The media's ability to report freely is especially
important in regard to matters of great public concern. However,
Bartnicki stretches that freedom too far. At some point, the need for
privacy outweighs the public's need to know. Bartnicki represents
that point. Suppose the Wyoming Valley West teachers decide to
strike. If inefficiency in the negotiating process increases because of
fear of disclosure of private conversations of either side, the teachers
will be on strike for much longer than necessary. Certainly, this will
have a negative impact on the community. While the teachers are on
strike, their students are not in school. Without a doubt, the parents
of those students would much rather not know what the union's
negotiating strategies are than being faced with the unexpected need
for child care. While this example may be extreme, it is nonetheless
plausible. The sensitive nature of Bartnicki and Kane's conversation
precluded it from being publicly held while still achieving their
agenda. Instead, they chose to have the conversation in private, and
that decision should be respected.
V. BARTNICKI'S IMPACT ON LOUISIANA
Bartnicki has particular significance for Louisiana. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 15:1303 130 has nearly the same language as those
statutes declared unconstitutional in Bartnicki. Its viability, in light
of Bartnicki, is now in jeopardy. Rather than repeal the statute,
however, the Louisiana legislature should revise it to meet the
Bartnicki standard.
The only real difference in the Louisiana statute is the mens rea
requirement and the absence of protection for electronic
130. La. R.S. 15:1303 (2001).
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communications. The Louisiana statute makes it unlawful for any
person to "willfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral
communication.' 3 ' Disclosure is also prohibited, as the statute
makes it unlawful for any person to "willfully disclose, or endeavor
to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral
communication in violation of this subsection." 32
After Bartnicki, the disclosure provision of the Louisiana statute
is now unconstitutional on its face. There are several ways the
legislature can remedy this problem. In order to maintain most of the
substance of the current provision, the legislature should read
Bartnicki as narrowly as possible when amending Louisiana Revised
Statutes 15:1303. For example, one could narrowly read Bartnicki to
only apply to conversations on cellular phones. With that reading, the
legislature could leave most of the current statute intact and merely
make an exception for cellular phones. All other forms of oral or
wire communications could remain protected. The legislature could
also read Bartnicki narrowly to make an exception only for matters of
public concern. The majority relied heavily on the fact that the
conversation at issue was of public concern. They used this to justify
finding the media's interest outweighed the privacy interest. The
problem with a public concern exception, however, is that it is an
extremely nebulous concept. This will once again leave application
of the statute in the hands of the courts. Alternatively, the legislature
could incorporate both exceptions.
Now that Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1303 is facially
unconstitutional, the legislature should amend it. As this article
points out, the privacy interest protected by the statute is an important
one; therefore, repealing the statute should not be an option. Instead,
the legislature should create exceptions to the disclosure provision
based on a narrow reading of Bartnicki.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper is incorrect
for several reasons. Nearly every legislative body in the United States
made a sound judgment to protect illegally intercepted phone
conversations from public disclosure. Congress and 40 state
legislatures recognized the importance of keeping telephone
conversations protected from government and private interests. The
131. La.R.S. 15:1303(A)(1) (2001).
132. La. R.S. 15:1303(A)(3) (2001).
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Court ignored that judgment and replaced it with its own. The
decision also applied the wrong standard of review. The statutes
involved are content neutral laws. This dictates the application of
intermediate scrutiny. Nonetheless, following a line of cases
reviewing content based laws, the Court improperly applied strict
scrutiny. Finally, the Court's decision is wrong because it ignores
social reality. Privacy of communication is a long recognized interest
of great importance. Without it, society and government become less
efficient. Bartnicki erodes the protection we have to speak privately
and creates exactly the outcome it purports to prevent: the chilling of
free speech.
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